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Lena Adamson*
PoLITICAL INTERFERENCE 
IN HIGHER EDUCATIoN QUALITY ASSURANCE 
THE SWEDISH CASE
This paper presents the Swedish national Quality Assurance sys-
tem for Higher Education introduced in 2011. The system was cre-
ated by officials at the Ministry of Education and introduced by
the Government in spite of a) widespread criticism from the Swedish
Higher Education sector, students, national and international ex-
pertise, and b) the existence of a well accepted proposal for a new
system created by the Higher Education Agency in collaboration
with academia and students. The system caused Sweden to be ex-
cluded from the European Association for Quality Assurance in
Higher Education (ENQA). The article reflects on the need for or-
ganisations as ENQA not only to guarantee quality but also to guard
the border between the Higher Education Institutions and the po-
litical powers.
* Associate professor of psychology/HE expert, Stockholm University
<lena.adamson@me.com>.
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THE PHENoMENoN and practices of audits and quality assurance
systems have increased dramatically in all sectors of society during
recent decades. Since mass education became a reality the turn
has also come to academia, which previously has lived a compa -
ratively secluded life in relation to state control. This does not
necessarily need to be a bad thing if done wisely (although it
may take some getting used to for academia itself). All stake-
holders in higher education (HE); policymakers, students, busi-
nesses and organizations must be granted the right to some in-
sights and information about the quality of HE activities and op-
erations. In countries where HE is funded through taxes, this
obviously also applies to the country’s taxpayers. As policy in-
struments a national quality assurance (NQA) system is also the
best and perhaps the only really powerful tool to drive develop-
ment in a systematic manner. The HE sector must be considered
one of the most important actors when it comes to shaping our
future; contributing with much needed innovations and solu-
tions and not the least, students’ with new mind-sets, ready to
deal with humanities’ grand challenges (Adamson 2014). For this
we need intelligent quality assurance systems (possibly) combined
with national and international benchmarking systems (Adam-
son 2013), in order to utilise all the knowledge and creativity
that exists within academia in the best possible way. But this is
something different from excessive needs of state control com-
bined with ignorance and political prestige.
This paper is an analysis of the Swedish national quality as-
surance system for HE introduced in 2011 (Högskoleverket, HSV/
The National Agency for Higher Education 2010). The system is
based on an unusually detailed Government bill ‘Focus on know -
ledge’ (Regeringen/The Swedish Government 2010a) passed in
Parliament late spring 2010. This bill was fully prepared at the
Ministry of Education, which meant excluding its competent
authority, at the time HSV from the process.1 This was primarily
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1. The state administrative system in Sweden consists of the Govern-
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 22/08/2021 16:25:52 |
driven by the then Secretary of State, the continuous driving
force behind the process during which time (2009 to 2014) there
has been three ministers of education involved. 
The system was introduced despite widespread criticism from
the Swedish HE sector, the Association of Swedish Higher Edu-
cation (Sveriges Universitets och Högskoleförbund, SUHF 2010),
the Swedish National Student Union, the Swedish Association
of University Teachers (Sveriges Universitetslärarförbund, SUHF
2010), the European Student Union, (ESU 2012), and national
and international expertise. It fulfils only three of the fourteen
standards in the European Standards and Guidelines, (ESG: EN-
QA 2009a) adopted at the Bologna ministerial conference in
Bergen 2005 and subsequently has caused Sweden to be exclud-
ed from membership in the European Association for Quality
Assurance in Higher Education, ENQA, from 2014 (ENQA 2013),
an organization that Sweden once was part of creating. 
The paper is based on Adamson (2013a), it begins with a
general background on the development of quality assurance in
HE within the Bologna process, then a section describing the
(political) processes around the Swedish case followed by an
analysis of the system. It ends with some reflections on political
interference in quality assurance of HE. The paper also uses
concrete examples from evaluations done with the system to il-
lustrate certain points.2 Annexed is also a Timeline illustrating
some of the central events from 2009-2014. 
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mental offices including the ministries with overall political responsibilities
of submitting legislative proposals to the Parliament and implementing the
Parliament decisions. Tied to each ministry there are one or more Govern-
ment agencies (competent authorities?). Government bills are produced at
the ministries but normally based on the reports from government assign-
ments produced at the competent authorities tied to the ministry or other
external expertise.
2. Information about evaluations made during the period 2011-2014
used in this article has been accessed from the website of the Higher Edu-
cation Authority (UKÄ), Resultatsok http://kvalitet.uka.se/resultatsok.4.25ae
7641136bb9ef9e38000719.html
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Quality Assurance and Higher Education. 
A Summary of  the European Development 
Within the Bologna Process
The Bologna process started out much as a structural reform,
working towards European degrees to become more similar in
terms of length and credits in order to obtain greater compati-
bility and comparability between the different countries. The
two-cycle model (bachelor and master) was adopted in the
Bologna declaration, 1999, and a third cycle (doctoral) was first
mentioned in the Berlin communiqué 2003, and later adopted
in Bergen 2005. 
The topic of quality assurance was however mentioned al-
ready in the Bologna declaration, the subject was revisited in
Prague 2001, but the big leap occurred at the ministerial meeting
in Bergen, 2005. Here the Qualification Framework for European
Higher Education Area (QF-EHEA, ‘the Dublin Descriptors’ also
‘the Bologna Framework’) was adopted together with the afore
mentioned European Standards and Guidelines proposed by EN-
QA. The ESG has since become a very important document list-
ing standards (criteria) both for HEIs and the national quality as-
surance agencies. It is currently going through a revision before
the next ministerial meeting in Yerevan, Armenia in 2015. 
A further step was taken in London where the European
Quality Assurance Register (EQAR) was endorsed and later founded
by the E4 group (ENQA, the European Student Union, the Eu-
ropean University Association, and the European Association of
Institutions of Higher Education) in 2008. This register now in-
cludes 32 European quality assurance agencies. Since 2006 the
E4 group has also jointly organised The European Quality Assur-
ance Forum (EQAF), where European developments in quality
assurance are discussed on different themes on a regular basis. 
Two main issues have been discussed during these years, a)
the relationship between the HEIs and the quality assurance agen-
cies and b), the balance (especially in national quality assurance
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systems), between accountability and promoting quality. A gen-
eral consensus between most parties exists in that HEIs are the
ones that carry the main responsibility of quality assurance and
that the ultimate goal of all quality assurance, internal or exter-
nal, is to enhance quality and quality culture (Adamson & Flod-
strom 2013). This is especially pertinent in the case of the Swedish
system described in this article, where the dimension of pro-
moting quality was ruled out and that of accountability (‘results’)
instead was made the leading principle (The Swedish Govern-
ment 2010a, 2010b).
In sum, the Bologna process, in particular members of the
E4 group but also many others have truly put quality assurance
issues on the agenda as one of the key drivers for educational
quality. Here ‘the learning outcome paradigm’ (‘outcome based
teaching and learning’ in US), has been emphasised as the key
component for driving ‘the transition towards student-centred
higher education and away from teacher-driven provision’ as it
was formulated in the London Communiqué in 2007.
As a signatory of the Bologna Process the country agrees to
be part of creating a harmonized (not standardized) European
Higher Education Area (EHEA), which operates in the interests
of Europe’s development. This includes the creation of a na-
tional QA system which is in line with the Bologna intentions.
The Development of  the Swedish System
National quality assurance systems were originally introduced
in Sweden during the 1990’s, and has then had a few different
formats but in general been geared towards quality enhance-
ment, not quality control. The system originally planned for use
from 2007 to 20123 however, got very severely criticized by the
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3. For the sake of clarity; this paper refers to three QA systems, nr 1
2007-2012 but stopped 2008, nr 2 presented to the government in Septem-
ber 2009 but discarded, and nr 3 the system introduced 2011 and the cause
of Sweden’s exclusion from ENQA. 
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HE sector and was therefore withdrawn by the new Universi-
ty Chancellor in autumn 2008. 
The critique was published in a report by the Swedish As-
sociation of Higher Education (Sveriges Universitets och Hög -
skoleförbund, SUHF 2008), and made public in an article in the
major daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter (DN 2008). The article
was signed by seven university Vice Chancellors. 
The major point of concern was a lack of transparency and
that evaluation results were found to be very unreliable when
they were compared both between programs and between HEIs.
In addition, the system did not take into account the significant
changes initiated and prompted the Bologna process. In 2008,
many Swedish HEIs had begun to embed these changes into
their curricula in accordance with the Swedish Higher Educa-
tion ordinance (HEo) of 2007. 
At this juncture, relations between the HE Agency4 and the
HEIs in Sweden were toxic. All trust had been eroded. The re-
sult was that the head of the Agency’s quality assurance depart-
ment, who (together with the former University Chancellor) was
responsible for the 2007-2012 system, resigned in early 2009.
After withdrawing this system the new University Chancel-
lor, requested a formal Governmental assignment to create a new
national quality assurance system, where collaboration with HEIs
and the national student union should be stipulated as the modus
operandi in the terms of reference. At the time it was crucial
that all parties involved (including the staff at the Agency who
were not accustomed to this approach) were fully informed of
their shared responsibility and of their shared opportunity to
influence this process. 
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4. At that time The Swedish National Agency for Higher Education (HSV),
reorganised in 2013 to The Swedish Higher Education Authority, UKÄ. The
terms HE Agency and Agency will also be used through out the paper.
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The Government assignment
When a new national quality assurance system is created the
starting point ought to be an initial analysis of what sort of dri-
ving forces the Government wants to initiate. This is where the
ideological and political considerations have their legitimate place.
The system can then be constructed based on these decisions.
The ideological and political standpoints of the 2011 system
were first expressed in the written, formal Government assign-
ment that went to the Agency (HSV) in March 2009 (Regeringen/
The Swedish Government 2009). Here it was stated that the sys-
tem should have ‘a stronger focus on results’ than previous sys-
tems. This was uncontroversial since the Bologna process had
already put the spotlight on what students should ‘know, un-
derstand and be able to do’ after the study period and hence al-
so more outcome and ‘results’ focused. This was in fact one of
the criticisms from the HE sector concerning the 2007 system; it
was almost exclusively focused on input variables (numbers of
teachers and their degrees, localities, libraries, laboratories etc.)
instead of adopting this new approach where the planning and
performing (i.e. processes) and the results of the teaching was
evaluated. However, these standpoints gradually changed dur-
ing the six months HSV had to accomplish the assignment into
something else; that the system ‘should evaluate results’. Note
that these changes never were subject for any formal decisions
by the Ministry (i.e. a new version of the Government assign-
ment), but only communicated verbally to HSV staff at informal
meetings at the Ministry. In addition these meetings were never
preceded by any formal agendas and no official minutes were al-
lowed (the expression ‘soft governance’ was used). In other words,
there were now two assignments; one written and formally passed
through the normal Government decision process and one in-
formal, verbal, from the Secretary of State. The latter mainly com-
municated via one official at the Ministry at the regular meet-
ings HSV were ordered to attend for reporting on the on going
work. HSV chose to follow the formal assignment. 
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In the terms of reference in the assignment the Govern-
ment also requested that the new system should be constructed
so that it could constitute the basis for allocating some of the
yearly financial resources to HEIs. In short, the results of the
coming evaluations should be done on a graded scale where HEIs
with programmes that received a top grade would be rewarded
with money. The ones receiving the lowest grade would, as in
previous systems, have their degree awarding powers first ques-
tioned, and if sufficient changes had not been done after one
year, withdrawn. 
The delivery of  the Government assignment 
and the time after
on the 15th of September 2009, as requested, the University
Chancellor proposed a fresh national quality assurance system
to the Government. The proposed system had been designed in
cooperation with all Vice Chancellors and their quality assurance
officers, the National Students’ Union and representatives of the
national labour market organisations through a series of hear-
ings. Most were positive to the new proposal; many received it
with enthusiasm, a fact that must be considered unique in this
context. The reason for this can only be speculated about, but
the proposed system strongly promoted developing teaching and
learning methods into activating, modern and student centred
methods in line with the Bologna process requirements. When
this was turned into national requirements it was probably per-
ceived as a validation and strong support to all those individuals
who had been engaged in this type of work, often regarded as
low status work at universities in comparison to the high status
research activities. This may explain some of the enthusiasm, pos-
sibly combined with the interactive process between the Agency
and HEIs while creating it, contributing to a sense of common
ownership.
The proposed system (Högskoleverket, HSV 2009) was struc-
tured as three quality indicators and based on the learning out-
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comes approach; the first reviewing intended learning outcomes
(written statements in course/module descriptions), their assess-
ment and the teaching and learning methods used (‘aligned
teaching’), the second reviewing achieved learning outcomes
(here; actual student results in the shape of theses for bachelor
and master degrees) and the third, stakeholder opinions (stu-
dents, alumni and other stakeholders).5
However, the then Minister of Education and the Secretary
of State were not satisfied with the first indicator concerning
aligned teaching since this by definition would constitute the
evaluation of processes and not just of results.
A bizarre process then started. The Agency did not receive
any feed back from the Ministry but was at the same time invited
to numerous HEIs and conferences to present the system. At the
same time the Agency was reached by rumours that the Secre-
tary of State considered the situation to be a constitutional crises
since the Agency had not delivered what was asked for. This was
not communicated to the University Chancellor, although in-
formal communication between the Ministry and the quality as-
surance department at the Agency took place during this period
of time. Further rumours during the autumn and winter of 2010
were that officials at the Ministry now were creating their own
proposal of a new national quality assurance system. In Februa -
ry 2010 a concerned letter was sent to the then Minister of Edu-
cation, by the Chair of the Association of Swedish Higher Edu-
cation on behalf of all her colleagues; Vice Chancellors of all HEIs
in Sweden (Sveriges Universitets och Högskoleförbund, SUHF
2010). In this letter it was pointed out that the HEIs were sup-
porting the newly proposed system by HSV, which was considered
to become a strong driver of quality in an efficient manner. No
official answer was given to this letter. 
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5. This system has later been transformed into The European Institute
of Innovation and Technology’s Quality Assurance and Learning Enhance-
ment system, QALE http://eit.europa.eu/interact/bookshelf/handbook-plan-
ning-labelling-and-follow-reviewing-eit-master-and-doctoral.
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on short notice Vice Chancellors, the National Student Union
and the Swedish Association of University Teachers were invited
for a presentation of the Ministry’s own proposal for a new sys-
tem on the 15th of March. The HSV management was not in-
formed and later barred from attending this meeting. At the
meeting a power point presentation of the system was presented.
Instead of a regular consultation process where a report is sent
out to all relevant stakeholders, opinions on this power point
were ‘welcomed to be sent to the Ministry’, by the end of this
meeting. The Ministry received letters from 29 organisations
where 26 of these were highly critical. In the letter from the
Swedish Association of Teachers (Sveriges Universitetslärarför-
bund, SULF 2010) one could for instance read: ‘the proposed
system from the Ministry is inappropriate, unfortunate, indis-
tinct and partly incomprehensible’. 
No consideration to these opinions were taken and the bill
(Regeringen/The Swedish Government 2010a) with the ratio-
nale for the new national quality assurance system was (by then
heavily delayed) presented and passed in the Parliament the
2nd of June 2010. This bill is written in an unusually detailed
manner. It also contains a number of contradictions but the
most noteworthy is what is found on page 12; the national qual-
ity assurance system ought not include reviewing ‘the planning
and performing of teaching’ at HEIs. This was a very clear mes-
sage to HSV; the system should review results and nothing else.
This was later repeated in a new Governmental assignment to
the Agency in June 2010 (Regeringen/The Swedish Government
2010b).
This whole process led to that the Minister was reported to
The Committee on the Constitution, concerning the omission
to observe customary requirements for official and formal con-
sultations. The process also resulted in the resignation of the
University Chancellor (Myklebust 2010) and somewhat later
also the Secretary General/Deputy Head of HSV. The former
University Chancellor (responsible for system 1, withdrawn in
2008) and a number of staff from HSV’s QA department chose
LENA ADAMSoN124
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 22/08/2021 16:25:52 |
on unexplained grounds to support the Government’s results
model.6
The system was then created in detail by HSV during 2010
and the first reviews started to take place 2011. A review of the
system was made by ENQA the first time in 2012 and was then
heavily criticised by the review group for a) basically not being
a quality assurance system and b) because of the political inter-
ference in the work of the HSV (ENQA, review group 2012). These
risks had been presented in a memo to the Minister and the
Secretary of State in February 2010 by the University Chancel-
lor. Later that spring the Ministry had asked for a meeting with
the chair of ENQA and two of the Ministry’s officials had already
then received the same message. Hence, the critique did not
come as a surprise. 
Sweden’s membership was subsequently put ‘under review’
in September 2012, and in 2014 the final decisions were made;
Sweden’s membership in ENQA was terminated (ENQA 2014).
For HE-related issues, these events have received unprecedent-
ed coverage in the Swedish media. The whole affair (sometimes
called ENQA gate) has been brought up in a great number of de-
bate articles over the years7, it has been investigated in a series
of in depth programmes by Sweden’s Radio one, been subject
to a review by the Danish Center for Research Analyses (2014)
initiated by the Swedish Parliament, and it has been brought up
for four interpellation debates in the Swedish Parliament by
both the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Swedish Green
Party, every time defended by the Minister as ‘a system that will
lead the European way’. A number of astounding statements
can be found in the protocols of these debates, for instance that
‘HSV is a member of ENQA. They are now taking part with full
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6. The former University Chancellor expressed this in her private blog,
containing only this together with some familypictures, published before
the bill was presented in Parliament but later removed from the Internet.
7. About forty documents and a large number of weblinks are gathered
at https://kvalitetsutvardering. wordpress.com/artiklar-och-lankar/
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force in the efforts of renewing ENQA’s guidelines for how qual-
ity assurance should be conducted. We are not at all outside; we
are full members’ (Riksdagen/Swedish Parliament 2012). 
A Description of  the Swedish National QA System 
and its Basic Principle: to Review ‘Results’
The Government bill stated that the system should be based on
‘results’, defined as whether students had achieved the overar-
ching learning outcomes as expressed in the Higher Education
ordinance (HEo). This HEo includes overarching learning out-
comes (descriptors) for general degrees for all three cycles and
also for a large number of professional degrees in both the first
and second cycles (e.g. medical doctors, nurses, psychologists,
civil engineers, etc.), all based on the QF-EHEA. 
In the designing and execution of the system by the HE
Agency this was implemented as peer review teams assessing a
sample of five to twenty theses, regardless of the number of stu-
dents attending the programme. Each theses was to be assessed
on a selection of the HEo learning outcomes on a three-graded
scale, then summarised to a final evaluation of the programme,
equally on a three-grade scale; Low, High or Very High Quality. 
What was also new was the introduction of tying financial re-
sources (approx. 30 million € per year) to be allocated to HEIs with
programmes receiving the grade Very High Quality. Low Quality on
the other hand meant a new evaluation again within twelve months
where the HEI’s degree awarding powers would be withdrawn if
better results were not presented by then. The actual procedures
for this second review were not presented until a few years later. 
In addition to samples of theses, HEIs were also asked to pro -
duce self-evaluation reports and the system was originally (and
in accordance with the bill) also supposed to include opinions
from alumni. The latter was excluded during the first year the
system was in use due to that the Agency did not succeed in
gathering this information in sufficient numbers. 
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A further component that was to be included in the process
was site visits. These have later been executed in the shape of
Scype meetings between the peer group and representatives from
the Agency on the one side, and three to four representatives
from the programme under evaluation on the other.
As a curious component in the system (and as a response to
the wide spread critique that the system evaluated student quality
rather than educational quality and hence prone to a very strong
bias related to socioeconomic status), HEIs were allowed to in-
clude ‘relevant information about students’ back ground and ar-
gue how these have influenced the results found in the evalua-
tion’ in their self-evaluations, which was explained: ‘This is so
that HEIs working actively with widening participation should
not be disadvantaged in the system’ (Högskoleverket, HSV, 2010:
9). This part was quickly labelled ‘the excuse component’ by
one of the Vice Chancellors. 
Before analysing the system in more detail a number of fun-
damental problems can immediately be identified. First, in a re-
sult based system there is no room for self-evaluation reports.
These can by definition only describe student results, they are not
in them selves student results. Second the system builds on (small
and not representative) samples of theses from large programmes
but on all theses in small programmes. Third, the grading scale
does not allow for Satisfactory Quality, which in fact is a grade
always included in all HEIs’ grading systems when assessing the-
ses (in a logical sense all theses with this grade ought then be as-
sessed as Low Quality when assessed by the review teams). 
Last but maybe first; the system is based on the (results-)
question ‘Have students achieved the overarching learning out-
comes of the HEo’ instead of the (quality-) question ‘Do pro-
grammes ensure that students achieve the overarching learning
outcomes of the HEo’. Hence the system focuses more on student
quality rather than programme quality. This will be explained
and discussed in the next section. 
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The Basic Problem of  the System – to Review ‘Results’
Achieved learning outcomes, students’ study results, are never
only the result of educational quality. In all educational systems,
students’ performances are heavily influenced by their socioeco -
nomic status and background (SES). This is the fundamental
problem with the Swedish system. Methods wise, in the social
sciences, one would talk about the SES as a confounding variable,
where the quality in the students’ work could not be explained
by education quality, before this confounder had been statisti-
cally treated. Consequently, the evaluations of programmes can-
not distinguish between high or low ‘programme quality’ or high
or low ‘student quality’. What then should be remedied in a pro-
gramme deemed having low quality? Should the HEI develop
teaching methods or recruit a different student body? This is
where the political and ideological dimension enters the scene.
The driving force with a system exclusively based on student re-
sults (for HEIs who wants to come out well in the system) be-
comes avoiding recruiting students from lower income families
and ethnic minorities and thus working in the opposite direction
of a (much needed) widening of participation agenda. This in turn
awards the old, traditional HEIs and disadvantages the smaller,
regional ones. These facts were clearly explained to the Ministry
but was never commented on whether this was the political un-
spoken agenda or not. In hindsight, we can see that also other
reforms and decisions in both the school system and the HE sys-
tem has worked the same way. 
Regardless of the political/ideological aspects (which would
have been legitimate had they been expressed openly and clearly
in normal democratic ways in a democratic society), the system
that evaluates quality of HE programmes would, methods wise,
be rejected in any peer review process for neglecting the most
powerful of all variables in both social and other sciences; so-
cioeconomic status. 
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Practical Problems with Evaluating ‘Results’
In order to evaluate the results of any phenomena one needs
measures that cover what is evaluated. The only ‘student results’
accessible on a national, system level in Sweden consist of (first
cycle) bachelor and (second cycle) master’s theses (the so called
‘independent project’ which should encompass at least 15 ECTS
each). All other student results (tests, exam papers etc.) are owned
by the students themselves, and the only information that is
kept in official records is the name of the courses which stu-
dents have passed and the number of ECTS these carry. 
For the bachelor degree (180 ECTS) the theses covers eight
per cent of the whole programme and can in fact be written dur-
ing the mid part of the student’s study period (this is true for
first cycle general degrees). For the master programmes the the-
ses covers twenty-five per cent of the full programme (120 ECTS).
Hence, the quality assurance process evaluates very small parts
of the full degree programmes. To be clear, the Swedish system
does not include a final exam. The thesis instead is a paper (of-
ten a small study or project) chosen by the student together with
a supervisor on a specific topic, thus, content wise covering just
a small part the full programme. 
With other words, it is not possible to gain a full picture of
a whole programme and whether it contains the relevant con-
tent it should do or not, solely by studying samples of theses.
This is illustrated in the reviewers’ report in the evaluation of a
masters programme in sociology. Here the review team clearly
state that criteria concerning both sociological methods (where
both quantitative and qualitative methods should be covered)
and theories (where both classical and contemporary theories
should be included) were difficult to evaluate in the material
provided. Following the results logic of the system this pro-
gramme was evaluated as of ‘low quality’ on the grounds of that
three theses out of six (the sole basis of this particular evalua-
tion) did not pass on three of the five evaluation criteria. A de-
cision affecting the whole 120 ECTS programme which then was
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put under review with the risk of having its degree awarding
powers revoked. 
To summarize, the system drives development in a pre-Bo -
logna direction towards very traditional approaches to academic
achievement; a text demonstrating knowledge, disregarding the
skills needed to produce it. The system impacts on professional
programmes especially hard; in the future we will know nothing
about whether psychology students only learned cognitive be-
havioural or just psychodynamic therapy methods, whether fu-
ture teachers have learned anything about teaching mathematics
or grading their pupils’ work, if social workers have learned any-
thing about evidence-based treatment methods or just sociolog-
ical theories, if future engineers have learned anything about
solid mechanics when they build bridges and nuclear power plants
for us, or if economists have been taught anything about ac-
counting. What we possibly will know is if some of them can
write a thesis. The system is thus unable to evaluate anything to
do with the Bologna process such as personal development, the
usefulness of the programme on the labour market, the foster-
ing of citizens in a democratic society (Council of Europe 2007),
or ‘new’ competences such as creativity, innovation and entre-
preneurship, which are much needed on the European labour
market (Adamson & Flodström 2011). 
A Selection of  Other Problems
The system cannot be applied to large sections of  courses
and programmes
Some educational programmes either do not demand theses work
of their students or, more common, do not produce five (5) or
more theses per year, set as a minimum for a programme to be
included in the quality assurance process. In addition, naturally
all new programs where students have not yet written their the-
sis also have to be excluded in such a system. 
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When it comes to the third cycle programs these have also
been excluded but not for the lack of products to evaluate – doc-
tors’ theses. These have already been subject to external reviews
by one opponent and an examination board and also defended
in public in the Swedish system. In many disciplines a doctoral
thesis is also compiled of a number of already published and
peer reviewed papers. To introduce a system of ‘second opinions’
on this from a state authority, maybe overruling both universi-
ties’ judgments and decisions and also the scientific community
at large, would most probably have elicited uproar in academia.
one guess is that this was anticipated from the Ministry, and
hence avoided by not including third cycles programmes in the
new system. 
As already stated, basing the system on reviews of theses
leads to that a large proportion of each program under evalua-
tion does not get reviewed, but also, on an aggregated level, that
a significant proportion of the Swedish HE system cannot even
be included for evaluation (some say 25%, some 35% of the total
amount of first and second cycle programmes) because of its
construction with sole focus on results.
General problems with assessing theses
The problems with fair and reliable assessment of theses are well
known in academia; different assessors value the same work dif-
ferently even though they have access to written grading crite-
ria (‘rubrics’). As an example this author once initiated a project
where fifty teachers, first individually and then in groups of
eight, assessed six bachelor theses on a three-grade scale. This
resulted in one thesis receiving the same grade from everyone,
two receiving two different grades, and three theses receiving all
three grades; both ‘pass with distinction’, ‘pass’ or ‘fail’. Teachers
working in groups around assessment tasks, where they gradual-
ly form a culture of similar values seems to be the only way to
improve this, but theses assessment will most probably never
become an exact science. This problem is naturally the same for
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a quality assurance system that rests on assessing theses, but
this has not been acknowledged by the HE Agency. The review
teams have also been left themselves to organize this work. This
means that a number of different solutions have been chosen
and used; one reviewer per thesis in one evaluation, two reviewers
per thesis in another, or even one reviewer assessing one crite-
ria of all the theses in the review and then another reviewer for
the next criterion. The reliability problems can only be said to
be gigantic. 
Another source of error when only using theses as the basis
for quality assurance, is that teachers/supervisors may sometimes
play a central role in the production of these theses. The Swedish
system does not provide much extra resource for supervisors when
re-examining dissertations. This leads to a certain fatigue in teach-
ers when they have to re-examine the same dissertation again.
It can be tempting to give extremely detailed suggestions for
changes and even rewrite whole passages. The awareness that
the HE Agency will evaluate the coming year’s theses may of
course increase this practice. 
In summary, we cannot say that the assessment of the the-
ses are performed in a sufficiently fair and reliable way to form
the basis for decisions on programme quality. In fact the results
of one evaluation could hypothetically produce a different re-
sult if new groups of reviewers were brought in, or a different
selection of the HEo descriptors were chosen.
No checking for plagiarism – 
extra financial resources for what?
A growing problem in academia is plagiarism (ironically the Le-
gal department of the HE Agency has produced excellent reports
on this). The processes and the systems in HEIs for working with
this, still vary substantially. The Agency has no system for check-
ing for plagiarism of the theses that are used in their system,
neither do they require from the programmes under review that
this should have been done before the thesis samples are made.
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This means that in theory quality assurance results leading to a
high grading (resulting also in extra funding) of a programme
may in fact be based on plagiarism. 
The self-evaluations – a confusing and costly matter
According to ESG (and all known HE quality assurance praxis) a
national quality assurance system should always include a self-
evaluation. This is a document produced by the persons respon-
sible for the programme under evaluation and serves in most
systems as the main bases for the review. In the Swedish system
the role of these self-evaluation becomes very confusing. These
documents can by definition only describe preconditions (such
as numbers of teachers and their qualifications etc.), process
matters (details around the actual teaching) and descriptions
about student results, but not results. In a result based system
self-evaluations simply do not have a role to play. The reasons
for still including these in the system can only be seen as grand-
standing and an attempt to superficially follow ESG and tradi-
tional quality assurance culture and (as with the situation for
third cycle programmes) prevent an uproar from academia who
would not recognise themselves in the national quality assur-
ance context without these as a major part of the process. 
It is also interesting to have followed a few of the reviews
close up in reality, to see how academic staff has almost totally
neglected the fact that the core of the system is a small sample
of theses. Instead main focus and resources has all been put in-
to the self-evaluation work. In a sense this is yet another piece
of evidence that the model is so unrealistic that many has just
refused to believe its construction. However immoral, the most
effective way of coming out good in the system would have been
for department heads to for instance allocate double resources
for theses supervision and a very strict control on theses assess-
ment the year before the national evaluation. 
To continue, the instructions from the Agency for writing
the self-evaluations have been particularly vague and as stated
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earlier there are no evaluation criteria provided for these re-
ports for the review teams to use. The consequence is that the
approximately 2300 self-evaluations (2011-2014) have been writ-
ten in very different formats and thus impossible to compare.
Information from meetings between the University Chan-
cellor and a group of Vice Chancellors in spring 2012 (Bremer
2012) also tells that the Agency itself considers these documents
to ‘have a very limited value when it comes to decision mak-
ings’. Contrarily to this statement, they have been used for mak-
ing final decisions of programme quality; this will be discussed
in a later section.
Financial aspects
Financial aspects of national quality assurance systems are rarely
discussed which is unfortunate. The following is stated in ESG
(p. 20): 
As external quality assurance makes demands on the institutions
involved, a preliminary impact assessment should be undertaken
to ensure that the procedures to be adopted are appropriate and
do not interfere more than necessary with the normal work of
higher education institutions.
To produce a self-evaluation report requires substantial re-
sources in time for staff. A likely estimate is that about 2,300
self-evaluations will have been produced throughout the four-
year period the system has been in use. Drawing on data from
approximately twenty-five self-evaluations from several differ-
ent disciplines and HEIs, a mean estimate of working hours (re-
gardless if one or many persons had been involved in the work)
is between one and one and a half months of full-time work per
self-evaluation. Still very approximately, this equals salary costs
of 16-24 million euro for the four-year period the system has
been in place. These are costs for a component which basically
has no place in a result based system, and implemented in sec-
tor of society where the hollowing out of financial resources is
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estimated to around 750 million euro since 1993 (Frtizell 2012),
mainly affecting teaching time. To this must be added the near-
ly doubled yearly budget for the HE Agency in comparison to
the previous systems, and the 30 million euro a year that is used
for rewarding HEIs with programs which receive the grade ‘Very
High Quality’, another 120 million euro for the entire evalua-
tion cycle. 
A simple cost effectiveness analysis would have revealed that
such a system could not be considered economically justified. 
Form over function
The information about the results of the new system is presented
on a website (Resultatsok http://kvalitet.uka.se/resultatsok.4.
25ae7641136bb9ef9e38000719.html) in a very clear and structured
manner. This is new in a national quality assurance context where
ENQA already in 2009 stated ‘detailed and reliable information
on the quality of individual study programmes, faculties and
higher education institutions’ as one important priority for the
near future of HE QA (ENQA 2009b: 7). 
However, elegant packaging does not improve content and
this commendable information system has in fact led to that re-
sults produced by the system has received unusual media atten-
tion. Here journalists have been sadly seduced and have contin-
uously reported on decisions from the Agency on ‘Very High’,
‘High’ and ‘Low Quality’ of hundreds of programmes without
mentioning any of the problems with the actual quality of  the
quality information. 
In addition, the results are also reported in to the website
‘Study in Sweden’ (https://studyinsweden.se/) where students
look for information about programmes before making deci-
sions on where to apply; a fact that has worried both Vice Chan-
cellors and representatives of the National Student Union, all
with the knowledge of how the system actually works. A num-
ber of Vice Chancellors have taken the decision not to publish
this sort of information on their own university websites, re-
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gardless if their own evaluations were positive or negative, others
have not.
In fact, this type of information on Swedish HE programmes
has never been so systematically covered in the Swedish news,
including interviews with upset students wanting to quit pro-
grammes they recently have joined.
Does the system work as intended?
Does the system work on its founding principle; are decisions
on programme quality based on results and not also on processes,
that is ‘the planning and performing’ of the programmes, pro-
hibited in the bill? Both the Agency and the Government claim
without giving further evidence that it does, in that ‘it is possi-
ble to establish whether students have reached the learning out-
comes of the HEo descriptors by evaluating a selection of theses’.
In e-mail communication with the then head of the quality as-
surance department at the Agency, with a direct request of evi-
dence for these statements, the answer was simply ‘we and eval-
uators say so’ (Maria Sundqvist, personal communication 15th
of May 2012). 
However, by looking into Resultatsok (the previously men-
tioned information system) on individual evaluations one finds
a completely different reality, two examples follow. 
The review team for the Psychologist training programme
simply stated that the majority of the selected HEo descriptors
for this particular evaluation could not possibly be demonstrated
in a thesis and therefor instead used the self-evaluation reports
as the basis for their evaluation and subsequent recommenda-
tions for decisions. To be clear, they evaluated the ‘planning and
performing’ of the programmes instead of solely the ‘results’.
This resulted in that all Swedish psychologist programmes were
granted the grades High or Very High Quality (which they were
no doubt worth). However, if the system had been applied ac-
cording to Parliament decisions all programmes would have re-
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ceived Low Quality, meaning they would have one year to rem-
edy the situation other wise be closed down. 
The review team for master programmes in Public Health
reasoned in the complete opposite manner. They too stated that
the selected HEo descriptors could not be traced solely in the stu-
dents’ theses (in some of these programmes written in the for-
mat of published papers), but came to the conclusion that since
this was what was required from the team, they were forced to
give some of these programmes the grade Low Quality. 
These are just two examples of the big variation between
how individual review teams have handled the situation. The
consequence is a national quality assurance system where no
one knows what will be evaluated and on what criteria (remem-
ber, there are no existing criteria for evaluating the self-evalua-
tion reports since these should not be the basis for any decisions).
This in a system that results in extra funding for those who
come out well, and (even more serious) the possible withdrawal
of degree awarding powers for those who do not come out well. 
All this has been fully ignored by the Agency, responsible
for following and implementing Parliament decisions. The Gov-
ernment has equally ignored it. 
To conclude, this national quality assurance system does
not comply with European standards, it has no legitimacy in the
HE sector, it cannot be used in large sections of the HE system,
it delivers non transparent results that has been compared with
a giant lottery system (Myklebust, 2012) and it consumes large
amount of financial resources where financial resources are very
scarce. In addition, the system does not allow for any interna-
tional peer review processes since most theses are written in
Swedish and no other documents such as programme, course or
module descriptions (which often do exist in English), are per-
mitted in the review process. It also encourages HEIs to put their
efforts into recruiting students who can be relied upon to pro-
duce traditional academic theses rather than to develop their
educational programmes into more modern forms suitable for
the 21st century. This does not rule out that individual evalua-
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tions have led to quality development (self assessments in any
system most often do), but here we must distinguish between
the individual cases within the system and the quality of the sys-
tem as a whole. 
On Political Interference
in a National Quality Assurance Context
one of the reasons for this system not being judged as comply-
ing with the ESG was the heavy political interference when the
system was created. This is not to say that the ESG is unreason-
ably strict on this point. on the contrary, they are fully compatible
with the Swedish political system where the agencies connected
to the ministries are considered to be ‘independent’. What it does
say is that a national quality assurance system has a very strong
impact on a sector of society, which (in comparison with other
sectors) has a special position in relation to the political power.
The temptation for politicians to use this tool is obviously high.
In ESG it is stated the following under the standard Inde-
pendence: 
Agencies should be independent to the extent both that they
have autonomous responsibility for their operations and that the
conclusions and recommendations made in their reports cannot
be influenced by third parties such as higher education institu-
tions, ministries or other stakeholders (ESG 2005/2009: 25). 
This was originally included to prevent unwanted interference in
politically authoritative systems (Christian Thune, personal com-
munication 2009). However, we can see from the Swedish case
that the temptation for politicians in all systems, to use the na-
tional quality assurance system as a tool for gaining power over
the operations in academia obviously can be high. It also shows
us the necessity to have organisations as ENQA; they do not only
guarantee the quality of HE for students and stakeholders, they
also guard the boarder between the HEIs and the political powers.
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Epilogue
In April 2014 a few weeks after the last interpellation debate in
Parliament on this issue, to everybody’s surprise, the Government
suddenly announced that a new national QA system should be
proposed by December 2014, and that the current University
Chancellor was to resign in June 2014 (prior to finishing his
mandate period). The explanation of this sudden turn is most
probably explained by the upcoming election in September 2014,
the national quality assurance system has been a problematic is-
sue for the (now resigned) Government. The current system will
be closed down by the end of 2014. 
The new assignment was given to a former Vice Chancellor
of one of the most prestigious Swedish universities (Karolinska
Institute, KI) who later also was appointed as the new Universi-
ty Chancellor. 
This time, the task description from the Government was
very short but included the crucial point that a new system should
be aligned with European requirements that is, ESG. 
This paper is written while we are waiting for the proposal
and the implementation of a new system. The conditions are
good in the sense that a new Government is in place hopefully
with a clear memory of what political interference in the national
quality assurance of HE can lead to – exclusion from the Euro-
pean QA collaboration and the subsequent consequences for both
students and HEIs in the international context.
Timeline 
Ξ 2008 late autumn: The national QA system planned for 2007-
2012 (system 1) was closed down by the University Chancel-
lor, due to severe criticism by Academia.
Ξ 2009 March 11th: HSV (the HE Agency) received a Govern-
ment assignment to create a new QA system ‘with a stronger
focus on results’ than previous systems.
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Ξ 2009 April-August: A series of hearings about a new QA sys-
tem with all Swedish university Vice Chancellors and their
quality officers, the National Student Union and represen-
tatives from the national labour market organisations.
Ξ 2009 September 15th: Government assignment (system 2)
submitted by HSV to the Ministry of Education.
Ξ 2009 october-December: No response from the Ministry to
HSV –rumours about a new system being created at the Mi -
nistry.
Ξ 2010 February 4th: Letter from the Swedish Association of
Higher Education (SUHF) to the Minister expressing wor-
ries about these rumours and strong support of the system
2 proposal.
Ξ 2010 March 3rd: University Vice Chancellors but not HSV
(University Chancellor or Secretary General) invited to a se -
minar at the Ministry of Education where a power point pre -
sentation of their self-made system is presented.
Ξ 2010 March 19th: Government bill ‘Focus on knowledge’
(Prop. 2009/10:139) passed in the Parliament. 
Ξ 2010 March: Written Question to the Minister of Education
by the Social Democrats.
Ξ 2010 April 26th: The Minister reported to the Parliamen-
tary Committee on the Constitution (due to lack of proper
submissions for comments/consultation).
Ξ 2010 July 1st: University Chancellor resigns from HSV.
Ξ 2010 June: HSV receives new Government assignment based
on the bill.
Ξ 2010 July: Secretary General/Deputy Head leaves HSV.
Ξ 2010-2011: New system (system 3) is created and launched.
Ξ 2012 April: ENQA’s review panel delivers critical report.
(The report was published on the HSV’s website but with a
very misleading Swedish summary on the first page. The then
Vice Chancellor of Stockholm University blogs that one should
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Ξ 2012 April 19th: Press release from Swedish Association of
Higher Education (SUHF) expressing critique and strong
worries about the present system.
Ξ 2012 May: Interpellation debate in the Parliament request-
ed by the Social Democrats.
Ξ 2012 spring: The first results from evaluations done by the
new system presented by the new HE Agency, UKÄ.
Ξ 2012 September: UKÄ receives ENQA status ‘under review’. 
Ξ 2012 october: Interpellation debate in the Parliament re-
quested by the Social Democrats.
Ξ 2014 February: UKÄ receives letter from ENQA stating that
their ‘under review membership’ cannot be extended and
will expire in September 2014. Again misleading informa-
tion is published at UKÄ’s website, noticed by The Swedish
Association of University Teachers: ‘The HE Agency conceals
information of ENQA membership’: http://www.sulf.se/Press-
opinion/Pressrum/Pressmeddelanden/ Universitetskansler
sambetet-morkar-om-uteslutning-ur-ENQA/
Ξ 2014 March: Interpellation debate in the Parliament re-
quested by the Social Democrats.
Ξ 2014 March: Interpellation debate in the Parliament re-
quested by the Swedish Green Party.
Ξ 2014 April: New Government assignment to propose a new
quality assurance system (‘compliant with European stan-
dards’) is announced at the Government website.
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